2. Concerning rational self-interest

In my previous posting, I promised to comment on “the human-subject in its phenomenological setting”. On consideration, I believe that such a treatment would be premature at this stage. Instead I would like to make some observations on the interesting, a concept which I broached in the previous instalment and which will be of continuing importance to future discussion.
As I said, the topic of this posting is ‘the interesting’. The way I wish to approach this idea is to consider it in light of a particular anthropological model, which we can set out in the following way. A human being is assumed to have particular needs, the satisfaction of which is the aim of all its activity. Need encompasses not only such things as the need for food and shelter, but more ephemeral needs such as the need for friendship and respect. We need, in other words, those things that enable us to survive and prosper in the world. We are interested in those things that enable us to satisfy out needs.
This theory of human behaviour is fairly attractive and I believe widely held. I am (alas!) too poor a scholar to know to whom I should attribute it, but certainly it underpins both evolutionary psychology and psychoanalysis. However the theory has a certain practical drawback: it doesn’t apply to real people. In the real world, people are interested in many things that aren’t in any way conducive to survival and prosperity. Why, for instance, listen to music? (I assume here that this is an interest of yours.) Why visit art galleries? Why read books? Why, to scrape the bottom of the barrel, collect stamps? Philately is surely only of reproductive advantage if the stamps one owns appreciate in value. Suppose you meet a raconteur at the pub and become interested in the stories he tells- is it reasonable to assume that this interest stems solely from a desire for phatic communion?
The problem with the model as presented is that, in treating interest as a stage in the process of need satisfaction, it makes interest into something insular, inward looking. In reality interest is outward-looking; it aims itself at what is Other to the self. Consider for example the news. Very many people make a habit of reading the news every-day: I myself have an interest in the civil war currently being fought in Libya. This interest of mine is, from the perspective outlined above, quite irrational. The only way the war in Libya directly affects me is when it causes a rise in oil prices, and this alone is not enough to justify the curiosity I feel.
So why then does the war in Libya interest me? Originally the story was one of a popular uprising against an evil tyrant, and so fitted a particular narrative (the democratisation of autocracies/ the little guy standing up to the school bully).As the story developed, new details emerged. It turns out that the rebel fighters are not particular competent. Oddly enough, this fact made the story more interesting, in that it made it easier for a lazy civilian to identify with them. The detail that Al Qaeda might have a presence among the fighters adds suspense, in that the audience is uncertain of the motivation of the protagonists.
In other words, I see the situation in Libya as if it is a story. It is a story, moreover, in which I have an emotional investment. What is the nature of my investment? The narrative of popular movements in support of democracy reinforces the belief of Westeners that we possess the best possible form of government. This is the real reason why we enjoy such narratives.
I should pause here, and take stock. Earlier I suggested that the nature of interest is that it is outward-looking, but in my analysis of my own interest in the war in Libya, I was led to the conclusion that my interest was founded on a desire to see my own society as meritorious. This suggests that interest does in fact ultimately related to the self . Do I contradict myself? The need to believe that we live in the best possible society is not a rational need. I argue that we cannot explain all interest as being ultimately founded on rational self-interest: it is either not self-interest or not rational At some level, for some reason, we project ourselves into situations outside ourselves. Of course, this is fundamental to literary appreciation and is something I shall try to explore further in the next instalment.